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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a differential privacy version of convex and nonconvex
sparse classification approach. Based on alternating direction method of multiplier
(ADMM) algorithm, we transform the solving of sparse problem into the multistep
iteration process. Then we add exponential noise to stable steps to achieve privacy
protection. By the property of the post-processing holding of differential privacy,
the proposed approach satisfies the −differential privacy even when the original
problem is unstable. Furthermore, we present the theoretical privacy bound of the
differential privacy classification algorithm. Specifically, the privacy bound of our
algorithm is controlled by the algorithm iteration number, the privacy parameter,
the parameter of loss function, ADMM pre-selected parameter, and the data size.
Finally we apply our framework to logistic regression with L1 regularizer and logistic
regression with L1/2 regularizer. Numerical studies demonstrate that our method is
both effective and efficient which performs well in sensitive data analysis.
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1. Introduction
With the development of the internet of things, a large amount of data has been
collected which contains the individuals sensitive information, such as medical pur-
chase records, hospital electronic medical records, web-site search information, home
address and contact information. Inappropriate use of sensitive information will cause
a serious threat to personal privacy, which will bring the risk of personal privacy
leakage. For example, an attacker can infer personal information or predict individ-
ual behavior by capturing personal sensitive behavior data easily. In order to avoid
the leakage of privacy, scholars have proposed many different privacy-preserving ap-
proaches. Sweeney et al.[1, 2] proposed K-anonymous method, Machanavajjhala et al.
[3] proposed l−diversity principle, Li et al.[4] proposed T-closeness and so on. These
technologies have been studied extensively and applied to privacy protecting. How-
ever, the reliability of these privacy protection models is related to the background
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knowledge of the attacker. When the attacker has enough background knowledge, these
methods may fail[5][6]. Dwork [7] proposed differential privacy in 2006. Unlike tradi-
tional privacy-preserving methods, differential privacy defines a strict attack model
which is independent of background knowledge, and gives a quantitative representa-
tion of the degree of privacy leakage, which can protect individual privacy information
effectively. In the seminal paper [7], Dwork gave the definition of differential privacy,
which can be stated formally as follows.
Definition Given a random algorithm M , Range(·) denote a collection of all possible
outputs of algorithm. For any two data sets X and X
′
that differing on at most one
data point, and for any S ⊆ Range(M), if
P (M(X)) ∈ S)
P (M(X ′) ∈ S) ≤ exp(),
then random algorithm M satisfies −differential privacy.
As a privacy-preserving technology with rigorous mathematical theory, differential
privacy is suitable for privacy preserving in the era of big data, and has a broad
application [8–11]. In the framework of differential privacy, the degree of privacy infor-
mation leakage is controlled by the parameter . As the  increases, the more privacy is
revealed, which means that the probability of individual indentification increases. The
advantages of differnetial privacy mainly include: (1) Differential privacy has good pri-
vacy protection ability even if attacker has background knowledge, because the attack
model of differential privacy is independent of the background knowledge. (2) Differ-
ential privacy has the post-processing property, specifically, if data published satisfies
a given amount −differential privacy, the privacy leakage will not increase with data
analyzing or re-releasing. The above advantages make differential privacy have good
scalability. Laplace mechanism[12] and exponential mechanism[13] are two common
differential privacy mechanisms. Although differential privacy has a wide range of ap-
plications, most of applications focus on data publishing [14, 15] and query processing
[16, 17].
In this paper, we focus on the regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) prob-
lems for binary classification, which is defined as follows
min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
O(yiw
Txi) + Pλ(w), (1)
where O(·) is loss function, xi ∈ Rp, yi ∈ {−1, 1}, w ∈ Rp is parameter coefficient
vector, Pλ(w) is penalty function, and λ > 0 is the tunning parameter which controls
the complexity of the model. Specifically, we focus on the Lq regularizer, which have
the form Pλ(w) = ‖w‖qq, where 0 < q ≤ 1. When q = 1, it is L1 Lasso type[18], and
when q = 1/2, it is L1/2 regularizer[19]. Our goal is to train a sparse classifier w
∗ over
the dataset while protect the individual privacy.
Differential privacy requires the output of the random algorithm being stable under
small perturbations of the input data[20]. However, the most sparse algorithms are
unstable. Xu[21] studied the relationship between sparsity and stability. Their results
showed that a sparse algorithm can not be stable and vice versa. Thus, the unsta-
ble property of sparse algorithm makes it hard to design a differential privacy sparse
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algorithm. Under some assumptions, there are some works on the convex sparse reg-
ularization approaches. For example, Kifer et al.[22] gave the first results on private
sparse regression in high dimension. They designed a computationally efficient algo-
rithm, implicitly based on subsampling stability, for support recovery using the LASSO
estimator. Smith et al.[23] extended and improved on the results of [22], based on the
sufficient conditions for the LASSO estimator to be robust to small changes in the data
set. They proposed the privacy algorithms for sparse linear regression. [24] designed
a nearly optimal differentially private version of Lasso. As compared to the previous
work, they assumed that the input data has bounded l∞ norm. In this paper, we focus
on differential privacy sparse classification algorithms. Chaudhuri et al.[25] proposed
the regularized classification method with differential privacy. Their results hold for
loss functions and regularizers satisfying certain differentiability and convexity condi-
tions, specifically, when regularizer is l2 norm. Zhang and zhu[26] proposed differential
privacy regularized classification methods for distributed stored data. Their mecha-
nisms lead to algorithms that can provide privacy guarantees under mild conditions.
Zhang et al.[27] extended and improved the results of [26], and based on modified
ADMM proposed a perturbation method to improve privacy without compromising
accuracy. Wang and Zhang[28] proposed distributed differential privacy logistic regres-
sion based on three step ADMM by noising the output of each iteration, which can
protect the local privacy. However, the above methods both require the regularizer
being stronly-convex and differentiable.
In this paper, we design a differential privacy version of convex and nonconvex
sparse classification approach with mild conditions on the regularizers. To solve the
optimization classification problem, we transform the solving process into three-step
sub-problems that can be easily solved by iteration process. And only at the second
step, the algorithm access the raw data. Interestingly, the algorithm in this step is sta-
ble which fits to the tramework of differential privacy. So we design a privacy preserving
algorithm. And by the property of the post-processing holding of differential privacy,
the proposed approach satisfies the -differential privacy even when the original prob-
lem is unstable. Then, we present the theoretical privacy bound of the classification
algorithm. At last, we apply our framework to logistic regression with L1 regularizer
and logistic regression with L1/2 regularizer. Numerical studies demonstrate that our
method is both effective and efficient which performs well in sensitive data analysis.
2. Differential privacy Sparse Classification Framework
In this section, we present the differential privacy sparse classification framework based
on ADMM algorithm, then we show that under mild assumptions for loss function and
penalty function, our method satisfies −differential privacy.
2.1. ADMM algorithm
ADMM was proposed in the early 1970s, and has since been studied extensively. In
recent years, it has been used in many areas such as computer vision, signal processing
and networking[29]. Now, we use ADMM to transform the solving of sparse problem
into the multistep iteration process. First, consider adding the auxiliary variable Z ∈
Rp, then model (1) can be rewritten as
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min
w,z
1
n
n∑
i=1
O(yiw
Txi) + Pλ(Z), (2)
s.t. w = Z.
It’s obvious that model (1) and model (2) are equivalent. Then we have the quadrati-
cally augmented Lagrangian function
L(Z,w, V ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
O(yiw
Txi) + Pλ(Z) +
c
2
(‖Z − w + V
c
‖22 − ‖
V
c
‖22),
where V is Lagrange multipliers, and c > 0 is a preselected penalty coefficient.
ADMM algorithm entails three steps per iteration
Step 1: Z updates,
Z(k + 1) = arg min
Z
L(Z,w(k), V (k))
= arg min
Z
Pλ(Z) +
c
2
(‖Z − w(k) + V (k)
c
‖22). (3)
Step 2: w updates,
w(k + 1) = arg min
w
L(Z(k + 1), w, V (k))
= arg min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
O(yiw
Txi) +
c
2
(‖Z(k + 1)− w + V (k)
c
‖22). (4)
Step 3: Lagrange multiplier V updates,
V (k + 1) = V (k) + c(Z(k + 1)− w(k + 1)). (5)
For detials, in iteration k+ 1, we update Z(k+ 1) via minimum L(Z,w(k), V (k)) with
respect to Z, update w(k + 1) via minimum L(Z(k + 1), w, V (k)) with respect to w,
and update Lagrange multiplier via V (k + 1) = V (k) + c(Z(k + 1)− w(k + 1)), until
the algorithm converges.
To establish the convergence of ADMM, we have the following assumptions on the
data, loss function and regularizer.
Assumption 1 Suppose that ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1 for all i = 1, ..., n.
Assumption 2 Loss function O(·) is strongly convex and Lipschitz differentiable,
with |O′ | ≤ c1, and 0 ≤ O′′ ≤ c2, where c1 and c2 are constants.
Assumption 3 Regularizer has the form Pλ(Z) =
∑p
i=1 pλ(Zi), where pλ(·) is re-
stricted prox-regular, that is, if for any M > 0 and bounded set T ⊆ dom(f(·)), there
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exist γ > 0 such that ∀z2 ∈ T\SM , d ∈ ∂f(z1), ‖d‖ ≤M,
f(z1) +
γ
2
‖z2 − z1‖22 ≥ f(z2) + 〈d, z1 − z2〉 ,
where SM := {Zi ∈ dom(f(·)) : ‖d‖ > M for all d ∈ ∂f(·)}.
Remark 1 In fact, the fitting loss functions include logistic function, and other
smooth classification functions, and the regularizers can be some sparsity-inducing
functions such as L1 regularizer, and lq quasi-norms for 0 < q < 1.
Now, we present the convergence of the above ADMM algorithm.
Theorem 1 If preselected parameter c satisfies suitable conditions, the sequence
generated by the ADMM algorithm (3), (4),(5) converges to the stationary point of
L(Z,w, V ).
Remark 2 Theorem 1 can be considered as a special case of [30]. This paper ana-
lyzed the convergence of ADMM for minimizing possible nonconvex objective problem.
Under Assumption 1-3, our sparse classification problem satisfies the convergence con-
ditions A1-A5 in [30], so Theorem 1 holds.
Although ADMM algorithm dose not provide faster convergence compared to other
gradient-descent algorithms, it has other advantages. ADMM transform solving of the
original optmization problem into solving two simple sub-optimization problems. In
Step 1, we only need to solve an univariate sparse regression which can be solved
by the existing sparse algorithm. In Step 2, we solve a L2 regularization problem,
which is easy to be handled. More interestingly, the properties of ADMM are useful
for obtaining a private version of the sparse calssification model. Notice that in Step
1 of ADMM, the algorithm will never call the training data set, thus it will not cause
any leakage of individual privacy, although in this step, the algorithm is unstable due
to the sparse regularizer. In step 2, the algorithm will call the training data, but now,
the objective function is convex and stable which is suitable for the framework of
differential privacy. Step 3 is also data-independent, which will not call the training
data in each iteration.
Based on the discussion of this subsection, it’s no longer difficult to study the differ-
ential privacy for sparse algorithm. In the next subsection, we propose the differential
privacy sparse classification method by noising the data-related sub-optimization prob-
lem (4). By the post-processing property of differential privacy, the update of Z and
V in each iteration will not cause the extra leakage of privacy.
2.2. Sparse Classification method with Differential Privacy
In this subsection, we propose differential privacy sparse classification algorithm, and
give theoretical privacy bound of the algorithm.
To achieve differential privacy, we perturb the results of each iteration of ADMM
by adding noise. Notice that the original data will only be accessed when updating
variable w at step 2, so we perturb the objective function (4) by adding cbTw during
each iteration, where b is a random vector, with the probability density proportional
to exp(−γ‖b‖2), and γ is the privacy parameter which controls the degree of privacy
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leakage. To generate this noisy vector, we choose the norm from the gamma distribu-
tion with shape p and scale 1/γ and the direction uniformly, where p is the number of
the feature.
Specifically, in iteration k+1, we first update variable Z via (3), then update variable
w by the following perturbing optimization
w(k + 1) = arg min
w
lprivw (k + 1)
= arg min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
O(yiw
Txi) +
c
2
(‖Z(k + 1)− w + V (k)
c
‖22) + cbTw, (6)
At last, update Lagrange multiplier V via (5). Differential privacy sparse classification
algorithm(DPSC) is tabulated as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Differential Privacy Sparse Classification Algorithm(DPSC)
Input: D = {xi, yi}ni=1, parameter c, maximum number of iterations K, and privacy
degree .
Initialize: Generate Z(0), w(0) randomly, let V (0) = 0.
Generate noise b ∼ exp(−γ‖b‖2).
for k = 0 to K − 1 do
Update Z(k + 1) via (3).
Update w(k + 1) via (6).
Update V (k + 1) via (5).
end for
Output: w∗ = w(K).
We now state our main result on the privacy property of DPSC. First, we give the
theoretical privacy bound of each iteration of DPSC.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 1-3 hold, and the preselected coefficient c > 2c2n ,
where c2 is the upper bound of the second derivative of the loss function O, then the
iteration k of DPSC satisfies the k− DP with
k =
2γc1 + 2.8c2
nc
,
where γ is a differential privacy parameter, and c1 is the upper bound of the first
derivative of the loss function.
Proof We prove that for any two data sets D and D
′
differing on at most one data
point, given {Z(r)}k−1r=1 , {w(r)}k−1r=1 and {V (r)}k−1r=1 , iteration k of DPSC satisfies
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k)| {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k)| {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
≤ exp(k), (7)
where S(k) is the set of possible outputs in iterations k.
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We have
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k)| {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k)| {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
=
P (Z(k) = Z∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P (Z(k) = Z∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
· P (w(k) = w
∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , Z∗(k), D)
P (w(k) = w∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , Z∗(k), D′)
.
(8)
Next, we analyze the two parts of (8) separately.
For the first part of (8), because the update of Z is independent of the data, this
step will not leak privacy even though no noise is added, and we have
P (Z(k) = Z∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P (Z(k) = Z∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
= 1. (9)
For the second part of (8), by the KKT condition, we have ∇w(k)lprivw (k) = 0, which
implies
b = − 1
cn
n∑
i=1
yiO
′
(yiw
T (k)xi)xi + (Z(k)− w(k) + V (k − 1)
c
). (10)
Given {Z(r), w(r), V (r)}k−1r=1 and Z∗(k), B andW will be bijective, where B andW are
random variables, of which the realizations are b andW (k). Now, let gk(·, D) : Rp → Rp
denote the one-to-one mapping from B to W using dataset D, then
P (w(k) = w∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , Z∗(k), D)
P (w(k) = w∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , Z∗(k), D′)
=
P (g−1k (w(k), D))
P (g−1k (w(k), D
′))
· | det(J(g
−1
k (w(k), D)))|
|det(J(g−1k (w(k), D′)))|
. (11)
where g−1k (w(k), D) is the mapping from w(k) to b using data D and J(g
−1
k (w(k), D)
is the Jacobian matrix of it.
For the first part in (11), notice that Assumption 2 holds, and for any data point,
‖xi‖2 ≤ 1 , yi ∈ {−1, 1}. We choose b ∼ exp(−γ‖b‖2), and there is only one data
difference between D and D
′
, say (x1, y1) and (x
′
1, y
′
1) respectively, so from (10) we
have
‖b′ − b‖2 = 1
cn
‖y1O′(y1wT (k)x1)− y′1O
′
(y
′
1w
T (k)x
′
1)‖2 ≤
2c1
cn
. (12)
Thus, for fixed γ, we have
P (g−1k (w(k), D))
P (g−1k (w(k), D
′))
= exp(γ‖b′‖2 − γ‖b‖2)
≤ exp(γ‖b′ − b‖2) ≤ exp(2γc1
cn
). (13)
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Consider the second part in (11), the Jacobian matrix is
J(g−1k (w(k), D) = −
1
cn
n∑
i=1
(O
′′
(yiw
T (k)xi)xix
T
i )− Ip×p,
let G(k) = 1cn(O
′′
(y
′
1w
T (k)x
′
1)x
′
1x
′T
1 − O
′′
(y1w
T (k)x1)x1x
T
1 ), and H(k) =
−J(g−1k (w(k), D), then
|det(J(g−1k (w(k), D)))|
|det(J(g−1k (w(k), D′)))|
=
| det(H(k))|
| det(H(k) +G(k))|
=
1
|det(I +H(k)−1 ·G(k))| =
1
r∏
i=1
(1 + λi(H(k)
−1 ·G(k)))
, (14)
where λi(H(k)
−1 · G(k))) denotes the i-th largest eigenvalue of H(k)−1G(k). Since
G(k) has rank at most 2, it implies that H(k)−1G(k) also has rank at most 2. Notice
that 0 < O
′′ ≤ c2, thus λi(H(k)) ≥ 1 > 0, and − c2cn ≤ λi(G(k)) ≤ c2cn , which implies
that
− c2
cn
≤ λj(H(k)−1G(k)) ≤ c2
cn
.
By the assumption c > 2c2n , we have
−1
2
≤ λj(H(k)−1G(k)) ≤ 1
2
,
since λmin(H(k)
−1G(k)) ≥ −1, then
1
|1 + λmax(H(k)−1G(k))|2 ≤
1
|det(I +H(k)−1G(k))| ≤
1
|1 + λmin(H(k)−1G(k))|2 .
thus
|det(J(g−1k (w(k), D)))|
| det(J(g−1k (w(k), D′)))|
≤ 1|1− c2cn |2
≤ exp(−2 ln(1− c2
cn
)) ≤ exp (2.8c2
nc
). (15)
where in the last inequality, we use the fact that for any x ∈ [ 0, 12 ], − ln(1−x) < 1.4x.
Combining (13) and (15),
P (w(k) = w∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , Z∗(k), D)
P (w(k) = w∗(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , Z∗(k), D′)
≤ exp(2γc1 + 2.8c2
cn
). (16)
Combining (9) and (16) , the lemma has been proved.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumption 1-3 hold, and the preselected coefficient c ≥
2c2
n , then DPSC satisfies the − differential privacy with  = K · (2γc1+2.8c1cn ), where
K is the number of iteration.
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Proof We prove that for any two datasets D and D
′
that differing on at most one
data point, DPSC satisfies
P ({S(k)}Kk=1 ∈ S|D)
P ({S(k)}Kk=1 ∈ S|D′)
≤ exp().
where S is the set of possible outputs during K iterations.
We have
P ({Z(k), w(k)}Kk=1 ∈ S | D)
P ({Z(k), w(k)}Kk=1 ∈ S | D′)
=
P ({Z(0), w(0)} ∈ S(0) | D)
P ({Z(0), w(0)} ∈ S(0) | D′) ·
K∏
k=1
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
=
K∏
k=1
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k) | {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
, (17)
and since we generate Z(0) and w(0) randomly, the last equality achieved. Lemma 2
shows that for each k, k ≥ 1,
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k)| {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D)
P ({Z(k), w(k)} ∈ S(k)| {Z(r), w(r)}k−1r=1 , D′)
≤ exp(2γ + 2.8c1
cn
),
Thus we have
P ({S(k)}Kk=1 ∈ S|D)
P ({S(k)}Kk=1 ∈ S|D′)
≤ exp(K · (2γ + 2.8c1
cn
)).
Hence the theorem is proved.
From Theorem 3, we can see that the privacy bound of DPSC is controled by the
iteration number K, the privacy parameter γ, the upper bound of the first and second
derivative of loss function c1 and c2, ADMM pre-selected parameter c, and the data size
n. With increasing of γ, the privacy bound increase, which means that the algorithm
leaks more privacy. Meanwhile, the noisy vector b decrease, that is, we perturb the
objective function with a smaller scale. Thus, the utility of algorithm increase. In
addition, as the size of training data increase, the privacy bound decrease, i.e. the
possibility of individual privacy leakage decrease. It shows that the large traning data
make individual more difficult to be distinguished.
Remark 3 Based on the idea of perturbing the optimization problem[25], we consider
noising the objective function of Z and w in each itertaion of ADMM to achieve
differential privacy. Notice that the update of Z is independent of the data, that is,
the original data will not be accessed when updating variable Z. Thus we only perturb
the objective function of w, then propose DPSC algorithm.
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3. Applications
In this section, we apply the differential privacy sparse classification model to two
typical models - logistic regression with L1 regularizer and logistic regression with
L1/2 regularizer. We propose privacy classification algorithms, and present the privacy
bound of them. The applications show that our method is suitable for dealing with
sparse classification problems.
3.1. Differential Privacy Logistic Regression with L1 Regularizer
The logistic regression with L1 regularizer [31] is a useful method to solve over-fitting
problem and has well generalization [32, 33]. It selects variables according to the
amount of penalization on the l1-norm of the coefficients. The logistic regression with
L1 regularizer has the following form
min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiwTxi)) + λ‖w‖1, (18)
where xi ∈ Rp is input variable, yi ∈ {−1, 1} is output variable. First, we add the
auxiliary variable Z, and rewrite the model as
min
w,Z
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiwTxi)) + λ‖Z‖1
s.t. w = Z. (19)
which has the quadratically augmented Lagrangian function
L(Z,w, V ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiwTxi)) + λ‖Z‖1
+
c
2
(‖Z − w + V
c
‖22 − ‖
V
c
‖22),
where V is Lagrange multipliers. From Algorithm 1, Differential Privacy Logistic Re-
gression with L1 Regularizer algorithm (DPLL) has the following steps
Step 1: Z updates,
Z(k + 1) = arg min
Z
λ‖Z‖1 + c
2
(‖Z − w(k) + V (k)
c
‖22), (20)
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Step 2: w updates,
w(k + 1) =arg min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiwTxi))
+
c
2
(‖Z(k + 1)− w + V (k)
c
‖22) + cbTw, (21)
Step 3: Lagrange multiplier V updates,
V (k + 1) = V (k) + c(Z(k + 1)− w(k + 1)). (22)
Consider the updating of Z, let Q(k) = w(k)− V (k)c , for i = 1, · · · , p, the coordinate
Zi of vector Z is updated by
Zi(k + 1) = arg min
Zi
λ|Zi|+ c
2
(Qi(k)− Zi)2, (23)
where Qi(k) is the ith coordinate of vector Q(k). It’s easy to obtain the solutions of
(23), which are
Zi(k + 1) =

Qi(k)− λc if Qi(k) ≥ λc
0 if − λc < Qi(k) ≤ λc
Qi(k) +
λ
c if Qi(k) <
λ
c .
(24)
To update variable w, we consider using gradient descent algorithm. Let m =
1, 2, · · · ,M denote the inner iteration index for the gradient descent algorithm used
to solve (21). For the minimization at step k + 1 of the (outer) consensus iteration,
the sequence of iterates w0(k + 1) = w(k), at step m
wm(k + 1) = w(m−1)(k + 1)− α∂l
priv
w (w(m−1)(k + 1))
∂w
, (25)
where ∂l
priv
w (w
(m−1)(k+1))
∂w =
1
n
∑n
i=1
−yixi
1+exp(yiwTxi)
−c(Z(k+1)−w(m−1)(k)+ V (k)c )+c ·b,
and α is learning rate.
Now, we present the Differential Privacy Logistic regression with L1 regularizer
algorithm (DPLL). The overall operation of the algorithms can be described as follows.
During iteration k + 1, we update each coordinate i of Z via (24), then update w
cyclically via (25), at last, update Lagrange multiplier V via (22).
The theoretical privacy bound of DPLL is presented in next subsection.
3.2. Differential Privacy Logistic Regression with L1/2 Regularizer
In this subsection, we focus on logistic regression with nonconvex penalty. As a typical
nonconvex regularization, L1/2 has many desirable properties and has been studied ex-
tensively. [34] proposed the logistic regression with L1/2 regularizer which enhances the
variable selection capability and alleviates the over-fitting problem of the traditional
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Algorithm 2 Differential Privacy Logistic Regression with L1 Regularizer algo-
rithm(DPLL)
Input: D = {xi, yi}ni=1, parameter c, maximum number of iterations K, maximum
number of inner iteration M , learning rate α, and privacy degree .
Initialize: Generate Z(0) and w(0) randomly, and let V (0) = (0, ..., 0).
Generate noise b ∼ exp(−γ‖b‖2).
for k = 0 to K − 1 do
for i = 1 to p do
Update Zi(k + 1) via (24).
end for
for m = 1 to M do
Update wm(k + 1) via (25).
end for
Let w(k + 1) = wM (k + 1).
Update V (k + 1) via (22).
end for
Output: w∗ = w(K).
model. It has the following form
min
w
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiwTxi)) + λ‖w‖1/21/2, (26)
where ‖w‖1/21/2 =
∑p
i=1 |wi|1/2 is quasi-norm. Same as before, we add auxiliary variable
Z, and rewrite the augmented Lagrangian function as
L(Z,w, V ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiwTxi)) + λ‖Z‖1/21/2
+
c
2
(‖Z − w + V
c
‖22 − ‖
V
c
‖22).
Based on Algorithm 1, we propose Differential Privacy Logistic regression with L1/2
regularizer (DPLH), which is tabulated as Algorithm 3. Here, the update of w and V
in each iteration are same as DPLL.
In iteration k+ 1 of DPLH, to solve (27), we resort to reweighted algorithm, which
has the following steps
Step 1: Set the initial value Z0 and the maximum iteration step T , and let t = 0.
Step 2: Solve
Zt+1 = arg min
Z
c
2
(‖Z − w(k) + V (k)
c
‖22) + λ
p∑
i=1
|Zi|
|Zti |1/2
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Algorithm 3 Differential Privacy Logistic Regression with L1/2 Regularizer (DPLH)
Input: D = {xi, yi}ni=1, parameter c, maximum number of iterations K, maximum
number of inner iteration M , learning rate α, and privacy degree .
Initialize: let Z(0) = (1, ..., 1) , w(0) = 1, ..., 1, and V (0) = (0, ..., 0).
Generate noise b ∼ exp(−γ‖b‖2).
for k = 0 to K − 1 do
Update Z(k + 1) via
Z(k + 1) = arg min
Z
λ‖Z‖1/21/2 + c2(‖Z − w(k) + V (k)c ‖22. (27)
for m = 1 to M do
Update wm(k + 1) via (25).
end for
Let w(k + 1) = wM (k + 1).
Update V (k + 1) via (22).
Output: w∗ = w(K).
end for
with an existing L1 algorithm, and let t = t+ 1.
Step 3: If t < T , go to Step 2, otherwise, output Z(k + 1) = Zt.
The initial value Z0 normally can be taken as Z0 = (1, 1, ..., 1). And with such a
setting, the first iteration (t = 0) in Step 2 is exactly corresponding to solving a lasso
problem. When t = 1, with easy linear transformation, step 2 can be transformed into
a lasso problem. It is possible that when t > 1, some Zti = 0. To guarantee the feasibly,
we replace |Zti |1/2 with |Zti +µ|1/2 in Step 2, where µ is any fixed positive real number.
The overall operation of DPLH can be described as follows. During iteration k+ 1,
we update variable Z via reweighted algorithm, then update w cyclically via (25), at
last, update Lagrange multiplier V via (22).
Now, we present the theoretical privacy bound of the DPLL and DPLH.
Theorem 4 Suppose that preselected penalty coefficient c ≥ 12n and γ ≤ cn − 720 ,
then DPLL and DPLH satisfy the − differential privacy with  = K · 1, where
1 =
8γ+2.8
4cn , and K is the iteration number.
Proof Obviously, the logistic function is strongly convex, Lipschitz differentiable,
with 0 ≤ O′′ ≤ 14 , which satisfies Assumption 2, here c1 = 14 . And L1 regularizer and
L1/2 regularizer satisfy Assumption 3. Thus, from the proof of Theorem 3, theorem is
established.
4. Experiments
We use the simulation and real data to illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithms
DPLL and DPLH. In all datasets, we preprocessed the data such that the input vectors
had maximum norm 1.
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4.1. Simulation
We study the classification model
p(yi = 1|xi) = 1
1 + exp(−wTxi) , i = 1, . . . , n.
where xi ∈ R100 is an input vector, xi ∼ N(0,Σ), covariance matrix Σ = 0.5|i−j|, 1 ≤
i, j ≤ n, coefficient vector w ∈ R100, where w(1 : 8) = (10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 0.5)′, and
w(9 : 100) = (0, 0, ..., 0).  is standardized normal random error, and sample number
n. If p(yi = 1|xi) ≥ 0.5, let yi = 1, else, yi = −1.
4.1.1. Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
In this case, we study the tradeoff between the privacy requirement on the classifier,
and its classification accuracy, when the classifier is trained on data of a fixed size. The
privacy bound of DPLL and DPLH is  = K · 8γ+2.84cn . Thus, the privacy requirement
is measured by the privacy parameter γ, iteration number K, pre-selected parameter
c and training data size n. In this case, we set K = 100, c = 2.5, and n = 10000. Then
we run DPLL and DPLH with γ increases. To measure accuary of two algorithms,
we record the classification error rate (CE) and mean square error (MSE). We also
record the average number of correctly identified zero coeffcients (C.A.N of zero) and
the average number of incorrectly identfied zero coe cients (IC.A.N of zero) over the
datasets to measure the ability of variable selection of two algorithms.
We have simulated 50 datasets consisting of 11,000 observations and each data set
was divided into two parts: a training set with 10,000 observations and a test set with
1000 observations. To demonstrate the effectiveness of DPLL and DPLH, we applied
the logistic regression with L1 algorithm (denote as LLA), the logistic regression with
L1/2 algorithm (denote as LHA), DPLL and DPLH to the 50 datasets. For each data
set, we trained classifiers for 5 fixed values of λ and tested the error of these classifiers.
Specifically, for non-private algorithms, we chose the tunning parameter λ by 5-fold
CV. And for private algorithms, we set the same value of λ with non-private algorithms
for the same dataset. We take differential privacy degree  as 0.1, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 and
4, and let gradient descent step α as 0.5. Due to the randomness of the noise, we per-
formed 50 independent runs of two privacy algorithms for each parameter setting, and
recorded the average results of 50 trials. Figure.1 and Figure.2 show the variable se-
lection results of non-private algorithms and private algorithms. Figure.3 and Figure.4
show the classification results of four algorithms.
From Figure 1 and Figure 2, we can see that C.A.N of zero of LLA and LHA are
larger than C.A.N of zero of DPLL and DPLH. And with the increase of privacy degree
, C.A.N of zero of DPLL and DPLH both increase. The stricter privacy-preserving
(smaller ), the lower variable selection accuracy (smaller C.A.N of zero). These results
show that privacy and variable selection accuracy can not be simultaneously satisfied
when training data size n is fixed and not large enough. What’s more, the variable
selection results of logistic regression with L1/2 regularizer are more sparse than logistic
regression with L1 regularizer, even though IC.A.N of zero of logistic regression with
L1/2 regularizer is slightly larger than logistic regression with L1 regularizer.
From Figure 3 and Figure 4, we can see that prediction error (MSE and CE) of
DPLL and DPLH are larger than prediction error (MSE and CE) of LLA and LHA.
And with the increase of privacy degree , prediction error (MSE and CE) of DPLL
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Figure 1. With the increase of privacy degree ,
results of C.A.N of LLA, LHA,DPLL and DPLH.
Figure 2. With the increase of privacy degree ,
results of IC.A.N of LLA, LHA,DPLL and DPLH.
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Figure 3. With the increase of privacy degree , re-
sults of Classification Error Rate of LLA, LHA,DPLL
and DPLH.
Figure 4. With the increase of privacy degree ,
results of Mean Square Error of LLA, LHA,DPLL
and DPLH.
and DPLH both decrease. The stricter privacy-preserving (smaller ), the lower predic-
tion accuracy (larger MSE and CE ). These results show that privacy and prediction
accuracy can not be simultaneously satisfied, when training data size n is fied and not
large enough.
4.1.2. Accuracy-Training data size Tradeoff
In this case, we study the tradeoff between training data size and prediction accu-
racy. Specifically, we examine how prediction accuracy varies as the size of the training
set increases when the privacy degree is fixed.
In this case, we set K = 150, c = 2.5, and  = 0.5 and 1.5 separately. We have
simulated 6 datasets consisting of 5000, 10000, ..., 30000 training observations and have
simulated a test set with 1000 observations. Then we run LLA, LHA, DPLL and DPLH
with training data size n increases. To measure accuary of two algorithms, we record
the classification error rate (CE) and mean square error (MSE). For each data set, we
also trained classifiers for 5 fixed values of λ, and let gradient descent step α as 0.5.
Due to the randomness of the noise, we performed 50 independent runs of two privacy
algorithms for each parameter setting, and recorded the average results of 50 trials.
Figure.5 and Figure.6 show the prediction results (MSE and CE) of four algorithms.
From Figure 5 and Figure 6, we can see that prediction error (MSE and CE) of
DPLL and DPLH are larger than prediction error (MSE and CE) of LLA and LHA.
And with the increase of the size of training data, prediction error (MSE and CE) of
DPLL and DPLH both decrease for two . The privacy bound  = K · 8γ+2.84cn of
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n, results of Mean Square Error of LLA, LHA,DPLL
and DPLH.
DPLL and DPLH shows that for fixed  and other parameters, with the increase of n,
γ which controls the norm of random variable b increases. Thus the prediction error
decreases. And our experiment results are consistent with this conclusion. Interestingly,
when the size of training data n is large enough, the results of the differential privacy
algorithms are similar as the corresponding non-private algorithms. Big data offers
more effectively protection to individual privacy.
4.2. Real data
We analyze the KDDCup99 data set from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [35].
The task is to build a network classifier, which can predict whether a network con-
nection is a denial-of-service attack or not. This data set contains about 5,000,000 in-
stances, and each instance includes 41 attributes. For this data the average fraction of
negative labels is 0.20. To preprocess the data, first we converted each classiffication at-
tribute to a binary vector, and converted lables {good connections, bad connections}
to {1,−1}. Then we normalized each column to ensure that the maximum value is 1,
and finally, we normalized each row to ensure that the norm of any example is at most
1. After preprocessing, each instance was represented by a 118-dimensional vector, of
norm at most 1.
In this case, we study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff and the accuracy-training data
size tradeoff. We applied LLA, LHA, DPLL and DPLH to the subset of KDDCup99
data set with different parameter settings. For non-private and private algorithms,
we chose the tunning parameter λ by 5-fold CV. When applied classification algo-
rithms, let gradient descent step α as 0.2, iteration number K as 150, and pre-selected
parameter c as 1.
To study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff, we chose 60000 examples from the original
data set, of which the number of positive label is 38420. We applied four algorithms to
this data set, set  as 0.1, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3, and performed 50 independent runs
of two private algorithms for each parameter setting. We recorded the average results
of 50 trials. Figure.7 and Figure.8 show the prediction results (MSE and CE) of four
algorithms.
To study the accuracy-training data size tradeoff, we chose 6 sub-datasets of size
n = 10000 to n = 60000 from the original data, and applied LLA, LHA, DPLL
and DPLH to these datasets. We also performed 50 independent runs of two private
algorithms for each parameter setting, and recorded the average results of 50 trials.
Figure.9 and Figure.10 show the prediction results.
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Figure 7. With the increase of privacy degree , CE
results of KDDCup99.
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Figure 10. With the increase of training data size
n, MSE results of KDDCup99.
From Figure 7-8, we can see that with the increase of the privacy budget, the
prediction error of private algorithms decrease. From Figure 9-10, we can see that for
private algorithms, the prediction error of private algorithms decrease. The results are
consistent with theoratical results in Theorem 4. This case shows that our methods
are suitable for dealing with real data.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a differential privacy version of convex and noncon-
vex sparse classification approach without stable condition on regularizer. Based on
ADMM algorithm, we transform the solving of sparse problem into a multistep itera-
tion process. In each iteration of our algorithm, we first deal with an univariate sparse
regression which can be solved by the existing sparse algorithm, then we solve a data-
related L2 regularization problem which is easy to be handled. To achieve privacy
protecting, we perturb the data-related step in each iteration. And by the property
of the post-processing holding of differential privacy, the proposed approach satisfies
the −differential privacy even when the original problem is unstable. The theoreti-
cal privacy bound of the classification algorithm is  = K · (2γc1+2.8c2cn ). The privacy
bound of our algorithm is controlled by the algorithm iteration number K, the privacy
parameter γ, the parameter of loss function c1 and c2, ADMM pre-selected parameter
c, and the data size n. With the increase of privacy parameter γ, the privacy bound 
increases, which means that the algorithm leaks more privacy. Meanwhile, we perturb
the objective functions with a smaller scale. Thus, the utility of algorithm increases. In
addition, as the size of training data n increases, the privacy bound  decreases, i.e. the
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possibility of individual privacy leakage decreases. It shows that the large traning data
make it difficult to distinguish individuals. At last, we apply our framework to logistic
regression with L1 regularizer and logistic regression with L1/2 regularizer. Numerical
studies demonstrate that our method is both effective and efficient which performs
well in sensitive data analysis. The differential privacy sparse classification framework
proposed in this work can be easily generalized to other regularization methods, such
as SCAD, MCP and so on. Furthermore, ADMM algorithm is an effective method
to solve distributed problems. Our framework can also be generalized to distributed
sparse optimization problems. All these problems are under our current research.
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